Monthly Archives: October 2017

Functional Language in an Apparatus Claim does not Always Make Claim Indefinite

Posted on by

In Mastermine Software, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., [2016-2465](October 30, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the court’s claim construction, but reversed the court’s indefiniteness determination, and remand for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

U.S. Patent Nos. 7,945,850 and 8,429,518 describe a process by which an electronic worksheet is automatically created.  The district court construed the term “pivot table,” resulting in a stipulation of non-infringement.  The district court also agreed with Microsoft that certain of the claims were indefinite for improperly claiming two different subject-matter classes.

On appeal Mastermine argued the district court’s construction of pivot table was incorrect because it excludes tables that do not display data.  However the Federal Circuit found that each time the claims recite the generation of a pivot table, they further recite within the same limitation
that the generated pivot table contains data or presents data.  The Federal Circuit further found that the specification further supports the district court’s construction, noting that in the context of the invention is to display data that can be viewed, summarized, and manipulated by users, and such user action is available upon the generation of the pivot  tables.  The Federal Circuit further found that prosecution history of the patents  provides additional support for the district court’s construction.   Finally, the Federal Circuit found that MasterMine’s arguments in support of its contrary claim construction were not compelling.

With respect to the finding that claims 8 and 10 of the ’850 patent and
claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ’518 patent were invalid for indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit noted that while a claim directed to both a method and an apparatus may be indefinite, apparatus claims are not necessarily indefinite for using functional language.  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court, finding the claims were simply apparatus claims with
proper functional language, like HTC and MEC and UltimatePointer.  The Federal Circuit said that like the claims in MEC, HTC, and UltimatePointer, the claims at issue merely claim that the system possesses the recited structure which is capable of performing the recited functions.  Further, the Federal Circuit distinguished IPXL Holdings and Katz, as the claims at issue do not claim activities performed by the user; they do not
explicitly claim the user’s act of selection, but rather, claim the system’s capability to receive and respond to user selection.

Because these claims inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that claims 8 and 10 of the ’850 patent and claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ’518 patent are invalid as indefinite

 

 

Objective Indicia Not Enough to Overcome Weight of Evidence of Obviousness

Posted on by

In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., [2017-1115] (October 26, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination at a bench trial, that claims 21-34 of U.S. Patent 6,486,150, on a method for preparing the antibiotic ertapenem were invalid for obviousness.

The district court reviewed Merck’s objective evidence and concluded that commercial success and copying by others were shown, but that the objective evidence could not overcome the “strong prima facie case of obviousness” established by Hospira. The district court found that, while there was commercial success tied to the asserted claims, the evidence was weakened” by the “blocking effect” of U.S. Patent 5,478,820 on ertapenem, which was a disincentive to others to develop new ertapenem formulations.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Hospira that the district court did not
err in finding that the claimed process would have been obvious at the time the invention was made.  While Merck argued that the specific order and detail of the claimed steps constitute a novel solution to minimizing degradation by hydrolysis and minimizing dimerization, Merck’s problem was that the purported “solution” constituted nothing more than conventional manufacturing steps that implement principles disclosed in the prior art.  The Federal Circuit said that it was reasonable for the district court to deduce from the evidence that the order and detail of the steps, if not already known, would have been discovered by routine experimentation while implementing known
principles. The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s analysis thus involved no legal error.

Regarding Merck’s objective evidence of non-obviousness, the Federal Circuit agreed with Merck that Merck’s evidence of commercial success should not have been discounted simply because of the existence of
another patent of which Merck was the exclusive licensee.  The Federal Circuit said that:

developers of new compounds often obtain a package of patents protecting the product, including compound, formulation, use, and process patents. Often such patents result from Patent Office restriction requirements  relating to the technicalities of patent classifications and rulings that various aspects of claiming an invention cannot be claimed in the same patent. Or they may result from continuing improvements in a product or process. Thus, multiple patents do not necessarily detract from evidence of commercial success of a product or process, which speaks to the merits of the invention, not to how many patents are owned by a patentee. Commercial success is thus a fact-specific inquiry that may be relevant to an inference of nonobviousness, even given the existence of other relevant patents.

Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit did not discern error in the district
court’s determination that Merck’s evidence of commercial success could not overcome the weight of the evidence that the claimed process was substantially described in the prior art and required only improvement by the use of established variations. Thus, even giving the evidence of commercial success its full and proper weight, the court did not err in concluding that the claims would have been obvious at the time the invention.

The Federal Circuit also agreed that the evidence of Hospira’s copying could not overcome the weight of the competing evidence of obviousness.

 

Judge Linn in Dissent Reveals that Alice has No Clothes

Posted on by

In Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, [2016-1233] (October 18, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,566,003, 7,568,617, 8,505,816, and 8,662,390, relating to regulating entry in a transit system using information from a bankcard, were patent ineligible.

The claims of the patent were directed to “a method for validating entry into a first transit system using a bankcard terminal,” “a method of funding transit rides associated with at least one public transit network, from a plurality of funding sources,” and “a method of using a bank card as an identifying token for time-based mass transit fare products,
without using writeable memory on the bank card.”

The district court held that “[s]tripped of the technical jargon that broadly describes non-inventive elements (e.g., the ‘interfaces’ and ‘processing systems’), and further shorn of the typically obtuse syntax of patents, the patents here really only cover an abstract concept: paying for a subway or bus ride with a credit card.”  The district court further found that “the recent case law has reiterated that whatever bells and whistles may be added, when reduced to their core, claims directed to the performance of certain financial transactions—and paying a fare is a financial transaction—must be categorized as
involving abstract ideas.”

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that taken together, the Asserted Claims are directed to the formation of financial transactions in a particular field (i.e., mass transit) and data collection
related to such transactions. The Asserted Claims were not directed to a new type of bankcard, turnstile, or database, nor do the claims provide a method for processing data that improves existing technological processes.

The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the Asserted Claims are patent eligible because they improve prior systems of fare collection
by speeding up the process at the turnstile.  The Federal Circuit found that this was not an improvement in computer technology (as in DDR Holdings), but merely the use of computers as a tool. The Federal Circuit further found that the claims were not directed to a combined order of specific rules that improve any technological process (as in McRo), but rather invoke computers in the collection and arrangement of data. Finally the Federal Circuit rejected the arguments that the claims applied to a particular concrete field, saying that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular environment does not
render the claims any less abstract.

Agreeing with the district court that the claims are directed to an abstract idea at step 1, the Federal Circuit turned to step 2.  The district court held that invoking various computer hardware elements,
which save time by carrying out a validation function on site rather than remotely, does not change the fact that in substance, the claims are still directed to nothing more than running a bankcard sale—that is, the performance of an abstract business practice, and the Federal Circuit agreed.  The Federal Circuit distinguished Diehr because the claims at issue merely use generic computer components in which to carry out the abstract idea.  The Federal Circuit distinguished DDR Holdings because the asserted claims do not attempt to solve a challenge
particular to the Internet.

In dissent Judge Linn,  arguing that the majority engaged a reductionist exercise of ignoring the limitations of the claims in question, would have found the claims in two of the patents patent-eligible, but finding that the analysis with respect to the remaining two patents “consistent with past decisions finding ineligibility” reluctantly concurred because he was bound by precedent to reach that conclusion.

Judge Linn explained that the three nonstatutory exceptions to patentability are intended to foreclose only those claims that preempt and thereby preclude or inhibit human ingenuity with regard to basic building blocks of scientific or technological activity. He said they are intended to be read narrowly.  He observed that the contours of the abstract idea exception are not easily defined, and for that reason, the abstract idea exception is “almost impossible to apply consistently and coherently.”

Of the Alice test, Judge Linn said:

The problem with this test, however, is that it is indeterminate and often leads to arbitrary results. Moreover, if applied in a legal vacuum divorced from its genesis and  treated differently from the other two exceptions, it can strike down claims covering meritorious inventions not  because they attempt to appropriate a basic building block of scientific or technological work, but simply because they seemingly fail the Supreme Court’s test.

In particular, Judge Linn took exception to Step 1 of the Alice Test:

Step one cannot be a hunt for the abstract idea underlying the claim, because underlying virtually every claim is an abstract idea. And if the task under step one is to assess whether the claim is directed to no more than an abstract idea, what is left for determination under step two? Where do you draw the line between properly determining what the claim is directed to and improperly engaging in an overly reductionist exercise to find the abstract idea that underlies virtually every claim?

In particular Judge Linn says that individual claim limitations
cannot be ignored. By virtue of their inclusion in the claims, every limitation warrants some consideration as to the role it plays in reciting the invention.  He said that it is also important to read the claims “in light of the specification.  Ultimately, the fundamental question in “abstract idea” cases is whether the claim is directed to such a basic
building block of scientific or technological activity as to foreclose or inhibit future innovation or whether the claim instead is directed to a tangible application that serves a new and useful end.

Judge Linn concluded that claims directed not merely to basic building blocks of scientific or technological activity but instead to innovative solutions to real problems that result from human activity and are not capable of performance solely in the human mind should be fully eligible for patent protection and not lightly discarded.

Judge’s Linn’s dissent correctly reveals that Alice’s Step 1, or at least the way that it is applied, does not correctly reveal whether a claim is directed to unpatentable subject matter.   Rather “it is indeterminate
and often leads to arbitrary results.”  He points out that claims to meritorious inventions are struck down “not because they attempt to appropriate a basic building block of scientific or technological work, but simply because they seemingly fail the Supreme Court’s test.”

Judge Linn is not the first to make these points, but his articulate and well reasoned dissent is like a shout — Alice isn’t wearing any clothes.  The question remains: will the rest of us stand around and gasp, or actually do something about it?

Posted in 101

Return to Sender: Secure Mail Patents Claim Abstract Idea

Posted on by

In Secured  Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., [2016-1728](October 16, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a motion to dismiss on the grounds that U.S. Patent Nos. 7,814,032, 7,818,268, and 8,073,787 (the “Intelligent Mail Barcode” patents), U.S. Patent Nos. 8,260,629 and 8,429,093 (the “QR Code” patents), and U.S. Patent Nos. 8,910,860 and 9,105,002 (the “Personalized URL” patents) are directed to subject matter ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Intelligent Mail Barcode patents recite a method for verifying the authenticity of the mail object. The identifier or barcode is a single set of encoded data that is generated by concatenating a sender-assigned unique identifier with sender data, recipient data, and shipping
method data.  The barcode is affixed to the outside of the mail object and an authenticating portion of the barcode is stored in a database. The
recipient of the mail object can access the database and use that authenticating portion to verify that a mail object is authentic.

The QR Code patents, require that the identifier is a QR code (two-dimensional barcode) which a user can scan to look up additional electronic information related to the mail object. Specifically, the barcode includes data that allows the recipient of the mail object to request data
directly from the sender and allows the sender to provide personalized data directly to the recipient, without the involvement of the mail carrier.

The Personalized URL patents are similar to the QR Code patents, except the identifier is a personalized network address, or URL. For example, the
user can type the URL into her web browser and be directed straight to a specific account, or to other personalized information.

The Federal Circuit rejected Secured Mail’s argument that the district court described the invents at too high a level of abstraction at Step 1 of the Alice inquiry.  The Federal Circuit noted that despite the district court’s statement that “a reasonably high level of generality” should be used, the district court’s analysis correctly found that Secured Mail’s claims are directed to an abstract idea.

The Federal Circuit distinguished Enfish, noting that Secured Mail’s
patents are not directed to an improvement in computer functionality — the were not directed to a new barcode format, an improved method of generating or scanning barcodes, or similar improvements in computer
functionality.

The Federal Circuit rejected Secured Mail’s argument that S the claims are specifically directed to a sender-generated unique identifier, which  improved on the existing process both by reliably identifying the sender of the mail object and by permitting the sender to create a bi-directional communication channel between the sender and recipient of the mail object. The Federal Circuit found that the fact that an identifier can be used to make a process more efficient, however, does not necessarily render an abstract idea less abstract.

The Federal Circuit noted that the claims of the Intelligent Mail Barcode patents are not directed to specific details of the barcode or the equipment for generating and processing it. The claims generically provide for the encoding of various data onto a mail object but do not set out how this is to be performed.  The Federal Circuit noted that in contrast to McRO and Thales, no special rules or details of the computers, databases, printers, or scanners are recited.  The Federal Circuit noted that there is no description of how the unique identifier is generated or how a unique identifier is different from a personal name, or return address. Rather, the claim language cited by Secured Mail merely recites that the unique identifier is generated by the sender.

The QR Code patents fared no better. The Federal Circuit noted taht their claims were not limited to any particular technology of generating, printing, or scanning a barcode, of sending a mail object, or of sending the recipient specific information over a network. Rather, the Federal Circuit found that each step of the process is directed to the abstract process of communicating information about a mail object using a personalized
marking.

Lastly, the Federal Circuit found that the Personalized URL patents are directed to the same abstract idea as the QR Code patents.

The Federal Circuit concluded:

The claims of the three sets of patents are not limited by rules or steps that establish how the focus of the methods is achieved. Instead, the claims embrace the abstract idea of using a marking affixed to the outside of a mail object to communicate information about the mail  object, i.e., the sender, recipient, and contents of the mail object. Because the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice inquiry.

At step 2 of Alice, the Federal Circuit rejected Secured Mail’s argument that the district court erred by failing to search for an inventive concept, and instead only asking whether the underlying technology were conventional.  The Federal Circuit said that the claims in Secured Mail’s
patents are non-specific and lack technical detail. Rather than citing a specific way to solve a specific problem as in DDR, the asserted claims cite well known and conventional ways to allow generic communication between a sender and recipient using generic computer technology.  The Federal Circuit pointed out that the patents themselves admit that the technologies were well known, describing them as “generally known to those skilled in the art.”

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidation of all seven patents.

 

Posted in 101

Ungrammatical Language Not Ambiguous in View of Specification as a Whole

Posted on by

In Organik Kimya AS v. Rohm and Haas Co., [2015-1983, 2015-2001] (October 11, 2017), the Federal Circuit  affirmed the PTAB decisions in IPR2014-00185 and IPR2014-00350, sustaining the patentability of the challenged claims of U.S Patent Nos. 6,020,435 and 6,252,004, respectively.

The patents are directed to processes for preparing certain emulsion polymers having improved opacity.  In the claimed processes a base swelling agent and excess monomer are introduced into an aqueous emulsion of the polymer, under conditions in which there is no
substantial polymerization.  At issue was was the meaning of “swelling agent” which the PTAB construed as not merely as being capable of permeating a shell and swelling the core of a multistage emulsion
polymer in the abstract, but specifically under the conditions of the specific process for which the agent is to be used.  Organik argued that this improperly limited the term “swelling agent” in a manner that inappropriately distinguished the prior art.

Organik argued that the specification was ambiguous in describing the swelling agent:

Suitable swelling agents include, are those which, in the presence of the multistage emulsion polymer and monomer, are capable of permeating the shell and swelling the core. Swelling agents may be aqueous or gaseous, volatile or fixed bases or combinations thereof.

and that the PTAB improperly adopted the narrower construction.  The Federal Circuit noted that the Board did not find the language ambiguous, and agreed with the Board.  Even under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the Board’s construction cannot be divorced from the specification and the record evidence, and must be consistent with the one
that those skilled in the art would reach.

The Board found that the prior art asserted by Organik lacked the swelling agent as that term was used in the claims.  Organik argued the one example in a reference, inherently showed a swelling agent, but Rohm and Haas provided experimental evidence through expert testimony  that it did not.  While Organik contested this evidence, the Board noted that Organik neither provided its own evidence, or showed how different experiments would have yielded different data.

The Federal Circuit found that Board concluded that neither Toda nor Touda discloses or suggests a “swelling agent” as required by the
’435 and ’004 Patents, and that the Board’s decisions are in accordance
with law and supported by substantial evidence in the record, and are affirmed.

The Board Misses the BRI with a Construction that was too Narrow

Posted on by

In Owens Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., [2016-2613] (October 11, 2017), the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB decision that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,137,757, which describes and claims methods for printing nail tabs or reinforcement strips on roofing or building cover material, were not obvious.

On appeal Owens Corning argued that the Board effectively treated
the “roofing or building cover material” in the claims as limited to material that either has been or would be coated or saturated with asphalt or asphalt mix, and that this limited construction was incorrect under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard.

The Federal Circuit noted that that the Board construed the claim term “roofing or building cover material” to mean “base substrate materials such as dry felt, fiberglass mat, and/or polyester mat, before coating or saturation with asphalt or asphalt mix, and asphalt coated or saturated substrates such as tar paper and saturated felt.” While the Board correctly noted that this construction “does not require an asphalt-coated substrate,” when evaluating Owens Corning’s arguments regarding
motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success, the Board made clear its understanding of its construction, and hence of the claims, as requiring materials that would eventually be coated with asphalt even if
they had not already been coated before printing.

After reviewing the Board’s rationale, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board simply did not address roofing or building cover materials that would never be coated in asphalt, and this was a mistake.  The Federal Circuit concluded that the correct broadest reasonable construction of “roofing or building cover material” would include materials that neither have been nor are to be coated or saturated with asphalt or asphalt mix.

The Federal Circuit found that it was not necessary or appropriate to remand the case, however.  On the evidence and arguments presented to the Board, there is only one possible evidence-supported finding: the Board’s rejection of Owens Corning’s challenge, when the correct construction is employed, is not supported by substantial evidence.  Moreover, Fastfelt did not argue for remand.  The Federal Circuit reviewed the record and concluded that the challenged claims were unpatentable for obviousness.

 

October 9, 2017

Posted on by

Back when crossing an ocean to an unknown destination in a 62 foot  boat was something worthy of praise, the life and travels of Christopher Columbus were celebrated, including in this patented badge and plaque.

       

Antigens Don’t Describe Antibodies, and the Value of Post-Priority Date Activity on Written Description and Enablement

Posted on by

In Amgen, Inc. v. Sanofi, [2017-1480](October 5, 2017), the Federal Circuit found that the district court erred by excluding Appellants’ evidence
regarding written description and enablement, and improperly instructed the jury on written description, so the Federal Circuit reversed-in-part the judgment below and remanded for a new trial on written description and enablement (concluding that defendants/appellants were not entitled to JMOL of no written description and no enablement.

The case relates to U.S. Patent Nos. 8,829,165 and 8,859,741 on  antibodies that help reduce low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDLC),
or “bad cholesterol.”  The district court  excluded Appellants’ evidence about antibodies, including Appellants’ infringing Praluent, developed after the patents’ priority date of January 9, 2008, reasoning that because the
evidence did not illuminate the state of the art at the time of filing,” it was not relevant “to determine whether there is sufficient disclosure of the claimed invention.”

However, the Federal Circuit found that Appellants were not offering
post-priority-date evidence to show that Appellees’ claimed genus is not enabled because of a change in the state of the art. Instead, Appellants offered Praluent and other post-priority-date antibodies to argue that the
claimed genus fails to disclose a representative number of species. As explained above, the use of post-priority-date evidence to show that a patent does not disclose a representative number of species of a claimed genus is proper. It was thus legal error for the district court to categorically
preclude all of Appellants’ post-priority-date evidence of Praluent and other antibodies. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for a new trial on written description.

The Federal Circuit also found district court’s improper exclusion of post-priority-date evidence requires a new trial on enablement as well. Under the enablement requirement, the specification of a patent must teach
those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.  Appellants purportedly sought to introduce post-priority-date evidence showing that Appellees engaged in lengthy and potentially undue experimentation to enable the full scope of the claims. Such evidence could have been relevant to determining if the claims were enabled as of the priority date and should not have
been excluded simply because it post-dated the claims’ priority date.

The Federal Circuit turned to the jury instructions on written description.  The Federal Circuit said that the district court correctly instructed the jury that in order to satisfy the written description requirement, a patentee may disclose either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or disclose structural features
common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can visualize or recognize the members of the genus.  However the district court went on to instruct that “the correlation between structure and function may also be satisfied by the disclosure of a newly characterized antigen by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties if you find that the level of skill and knowledge in the art of antibodies at the
time of filing was such that production of antibodies against such an antigen was conventional or routine.”  The Federal Circuit this instruction was not legally sound and is not based on any binding precedent.

The Federal Circuit said that this instruction improperly allowed a jury to find adequate written description merely from a finding of the ability to make and use the invention.  The Federal Circuit said that an adequate written description must contain enough information about the actual makeup of the claimed products—“a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials,” which may be present in “functional” terminology “when the art has established a correlation between structure and function.”
However, it is still contested whether the that knowledge of the chemical structure of an antigen gives the required kind of structure-identifying information about the corresponding antibodies.  The Federal Circuit said that Section 112 requires a “written description of the invention,” not something that is not the invention.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of JMOL of lack of written description and enablement, because with the exclusion of post-priority date evidence the record was incomplete to determine whether there is in fact a lack of written description and enablement.  The Federal Circuit also affirmed JMOL of non-obviousness, finding that the district court properly excluded the proffered prior art.  These references, two PCT applications were filed after the priority date, but claimed priority to provisional applications filed before the priority date.  The Federal Circuit noted that appellants did not proffer any evidence showing that the provisional applications contained representative species or common structural
elements sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement for the monoclonal antibodies claimed in the PCT applications.  Similarly, the Federal Circuit noted, Appellants provided no evidence that the claims of the PCT applications were enabled by the provisional application. Because the district court properly excluded the prior art relied upon by appellant, the court’s grant of JMOL of non-obviousness was proper.

Finally, the Federal Circuit vacated the permanent injunction because it vacated the district court’s judgment as to written description and enablement, and was remanding the case for a new trial.

It May Have Just Gotten a Little Easier to Amend Claims in an IPR; a Factionated Federal Circuit Holds that Petitioner has the Burden to Show Unpatenability

Posted on by

In Aqua Products, Inc., v. Matal, [2015-1177] (October 4, 2017), a plurality of the Federal Circuit en banc held that §316(e) requires the petitioner to prove all propositions of unpatentability, including for amended claims.

The “decision” consists of five opinions spanning 148 pages: (1) the opinion of the plurality of five judges, joined by two who concur in the result; (2) a separate opinion by three of the five members of the plurality;  (3) a separate opinion by the two judges who concurred in the result, joined in part by four judges; (4) a dissent by four of the judges, in which the two concurring judges join in part; and (5) a separate dissent by two of the four dissenters.

The 66 page plurality opinion of five judges (joined by an additional two who concurred in the result), vacated the rejection of Aqua’s motion to amend its claims, and remanded the Final Written Decision to the Board for reconsideration with the burden of persuasion with respect to the patentability of Aqua’s amended claims on the petitioner, and to consider the motion on the entire record.

The plurality opinion finds the statute unambiguously places the burden on the petitioner, but because six of the eleven judges found the statute ambiguous, the plurality opinion dove into a detailed analysis of whether the USPTO’s actions were entitled to Chevron or Auer deference.  While a delight for Administrative Law aficionados, the bottom line is that the most reasonable reading of the AIA is one that places the burden of persuasion with respect to the patentability of amended claims on the petitioner, and the Board must  consider the entirety of the record before it when assessing the patentability of amended claims, and must justify any conclusions of unpatentability with respect to amended claims based on that record.

Posted in IPR