Monthly Archives: March 2016

If You Can’t Say Something Nice . . .

Posted on by

In Bamberg v. Dalvey, [2015-1548] (March 9, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision in an appeal from a consolidated interference proceeding refusing to allow the claims of four patent applications because the specification failed to meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.  The involved claims disclose a method for the transfer of printed images onto dark colored textiles by ironing over a specialty transfer paper. The transfer paper generally contains: (1) a removable substrate coated with silicon, (2) a hot-melt adhesive, (3) a white layer, and (4) an ink-receptive layer.  During the interference proceeding, Dalvey alleged that Bamberg’s claims were unpatentable for lack of written description, because the claims recite a white layer that melts at a wide range of temperatures, while Bamberg’s specification discloses a white layer that does not melt at ironing temperatures (i.e., below 220°C).

The Federal Circuit agreed that the contested claims are properly construed to encompass a white layer that melts above and below 220°C, and thus Bamberg’s specification must also support a white layer that melts above and below 220°C to satisfy the written description requirement.  The Federal Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that Bamberg’s specification fails to meet the written description requirement.  Bamberg’s specification stated that the white layer “comprises or is composed of permanently elastic plastics which are non-fusible at ironing temperatures (i.e. up to about 220°C) and which are filled with white pigments—also non-fusible (up to about 220°C),” and that the “elastic plastics must not melt at ironing temperatures in order not to provide with the adhesive layer . . . an undesired mixture with impaired (adhesive and covering) properties.”  The Federal Circuit found that Bamberg did not possess a white layer that melts below 220°C because it specifically distinguished white layers that melt below 220°C as producing an “undesired” result.  This criticism effectively limited the scope of the disclosure.

In patents, as in life, Mom was right:  If you can’t say something nice about the prior art, don’t say anything at all.  Otherwise, your criticism may be treated as a disclaimer of claim scope.

The Privileged Few

Posted on by

In Queens’s University at Kingston, [2015-145] (March 7, 2016) the Federal Circuit granted a writ of mandamus directing the district court to withdraw its order compelling the production of Queen’s University’s communications with its non-attorney patent agents.  The Federal Circuit said:

To the extent Congress has authorized non-attorney patent agents to engage in the practice of law before the Patent Office, reason and experience compel us to recognize a patent-agent privilege that is coextensive with the rights granted to patent agents by Congress. A client has a reasonable expectation that all communications relating to “obtaining legal advice on patentability and legal services in preparing a patent application” will be kept privileged.

Whether communications are directed to an attorney or his or her legally equivalent patent agent should be of no moment — to hold otherwise would frustrate the very purpose of Congress’s design: namely, to afford clients the freedom to choose between an attorney and a patent agent for representation before the Patent Office.