In Becton, Dickinson and Company v. Baxter Corporation Englewood, [2020-1937] (May 28, 2021), the Federal Circuit reversed that PTAB determination that certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,554,579 were not invalid as obvious. The’579 Patent is directed to systems for preparing patient-specific doses and a telepharmacy method in which data captured while following a protocol associated with each received drug order and specifying a set of steps to fill the drug order are provided to a remote site for review and approval by a pharmacist.

At issue was whether the art disclosed a verification step. Baxter successfully argued to the PTAB that the art taught that there may be a verification step, but not that there must be a verification step. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit said that in the context of the prior art, “may” does not mean “occasionally,” but rather that one “may” choose to systematically check each step. Examining the reference, the Federal Circuit concluded that the purpose was to provide verification, and thus it satisfied the verification step.

Also at issue was whether the art diclosed the highlighting limitation, which requires “an interactive screen that includes prompts that can be highlighted by an operator to receive additional information relative to one particular step.” The Federal Circuit found that one of the references teaches highlighting in the pharmacy context, and said that the Board erred in looking to the reference as the only source a person of ordinary skill would consider for what “additional information might be relevant. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.

Finally, the Federal Circuit said that Baxter does not meaningfully argue that the weak showing of secondary considerations here could overcome the showing of obviousness based on the prior art.

Obviousness may not be established using hindsight or in view of the teachings or suggestions of the inventor. Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1237, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1995), citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 311, 312-13 (Fed.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851, 105 S.Ct. 172, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984).

Hindsight is inherent in the patent examination process. Examiner’s look at what the inventor claims, and with this information look for prior art to determine whether or not the claimed invention is obvious, flirting with “tempting but forbidden zone of hindsight.” See, Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 873, 228 USPQ 90, 98 (Fed.Cir.1985). The problem of hindsight is exacerbated by modern search technology which allows Examiner to quickly and easily find each and every element of the claimed invention, and all that the is needed is to stitch the individual elements together. Patent law has developed several tools to combat hindsight. First, 35 USC 103 requires obviousness of the invention “as a whole,” so merely finding the elements individually in the prior art does not mean that the invention was obvious. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Second, there is the requirement that there be some reason to modify or combine the prior art. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Without some reason the modification/combination is not obvious, and neither is the invention. Finally, there are objective indicia of non-obvious, often called “secondary considerations,” that guard against the hindsight reconstruction of the invention. See, In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996, 217 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed.Cir.1983).

When confronted with a hindsight reconstruction, there are a number of colorful descriptions of hindsight that can help frame the argument:

Using the Claims as a Frame, and the Prior Art as a Mosaic. In W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 311, 312-13 (Fed.Cir.1983), the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of obviousness, noting that “[t]he result is that the claims were used as a frame, and individual, naked parts of separate prior art references were employed as a mosaic to recreate a facsimile of the claimed invention.”  721 F.2d at  1551, 220 USPQ at 311.

Using What the Inventor Taught Against its Teacher. Also in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 311, 312-13 (Fed.Cir.1983), in reversing the district court’s finding of obviousness, the Federal Circuit explained the problem of hindsight: “To imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the invention in suit, when no prior art reference or references of record convey or suggest that knowledge, is to fall victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the inventor taught is used against its teacher.” 721 F.2d at  1553, 220 USPQ at 312-13.

Throwing Metaphorical Darts at a Metaphorical Dartboard. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2009), in affirming a finding of obviousness, the Federal Circuit cautioned that in the situation where a challenger, “merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities, courts should not succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness.” See, also, Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.(Eurand, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.), 676 F.3d 1063, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Collapsing the Obviousness Analysis into a Hindsight-Guided Combination. In Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the Federal Circuit reversed the obviousness determination in a reexamination, finding that “the Board erred by collapsing the obviousness analysis into a hindsight-guided combination of elements.”

A Hindsight Combination of Components Selectively Culled from the Prior Art to fit the Parameters of the Invention. In ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534 , 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit reversed a judgment of invalidity, stating “Determination of obviousness can not be based on the hindsight combination of components selectively culled from the prior art to fit the parameters of the patented invention. There must be a teaching or suggestion within the prior art, or within the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, to look to particular sources of information, to select particular elements, and to combine them in the way they were combined by the inventor.”

Using the Inventor’s Disclosure as a Blueprint. In Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 227 U.S.P.Q. 543 (Fed. Cir.1985), the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment of invalidity, noting that the court reconstructed the invention, using the blueprint of the inventor’s claims, and saying [t]he invention must be viewed not with the blueprint drawn by the inventor, but in the state of the art that existed at the time.” See, also, In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Ecolochem, Inc. v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371-72 (Fed.Cir.2000);

A Poster Child for Impermissible Hindsight Reasoning. In Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1729 (Fed. Cir.2012), in affirming the district court’s determination that the claims were not invalid, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court’s careful analysis exposed the Defendants’ obviousness case for what it was — “a poster child for impermissible hindsight reasoning.”

Simplicity is not inimical to patentability. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279, 64 S.Ct. 593, 594, 88 L.Ed. 721 (1944) (simplicity of itself does not negate invention); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1572, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1600 (Fed.Cir.) (the patent system is not foreclosed to those who make simple inventions), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052, 107 S.Ct. 2187, 95 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987). Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck, Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1334, 221 U.S.P.Q. 504 (7th Cir. 1983)(“[I]ntuitive analysis distorted by the invention’s simplicity and retrospective self-evidence must be avoided. Simplicity is not to be equated with obviousness.”); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 218 U.S.P.Q. 673 (Fed.Cir. 1983)(“That is not to say that simplicity of the invention, or its ready understandability by a judge, constitute evidence of obviousness.”) 

In DatCard Sys., Inc. v. PacsGear, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-01288-MRP, 2013 BL 440221 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 12, 2013), the district court said:

To be sure, the Court’s characterization of the patents-in-suit as “simple” is hardly a clue regarding its opinion regarding their validity under, for example, Section 103 . Patent law lacks a doctrine of simplicity. To be sure, as a matter of logic, technically simple patents are perhaps more vulnerable to obviousness-based invalidity than technically complex patents. But they are not obvious because they are technically simple.

(emphasis added)

But, see, Skee-Trainer, Inc. v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 361 F.2d 895, 150 U.S.P.Q. 7 (8th Cir. 1966)(“[A]lthough the simplicity of a mechanical innovation will not automatically render it unpatentable, simplicity is itself strong evidence that ‘invention’ is lacking.”)

In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 , 416 , 127 S. Ct. 1727 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 705 (2007), the Supreme Court cemented the role of common sense in the obviousness inquiry, noting that “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” The Supreme Court instructed that “[c]ommon sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Thus the Supreme Court said that:

When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.

550 U.S. at 421; 127 S.Ct. at 1742; 167 L.Ed.2d at 723-4.

After KSR, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the application of common sense in a number of cases. In B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc, 962 F.3d 1373, 1379-80, 2020 U.S.P.Q.2d 10706 (Fed.Cir. 2020), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination of obviousness of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,073 ,641 and 9,440,742 relating to space-saving technologies for aircraft enclosures such as lavatory enclosures, agreeing with the PTAB that it would have been a matter common sense to modify the prior art. In Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. Infousa, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1849, (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 6,631,400 directed to managing bulk e-mail distribution to groups of targeted consumers, affirming the district court application of common sense and noting that common sense has long been recognized to inform the analysis of obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning. In Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330, 2020 U.S.P.Q.2d 32509 (Fed.Cir. 2020), the Federal Circuit affirmed a PTAB decision that relied on common sense to supply a missing claim element, where corroborated expert testimony established that that element was not only in the prior art, but also within the general knowledge of a skilled artisan.

Of course, what is important to prosecutors is combatting the misapplication of common sense in the obviousness inquiry. That is what happened in Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) where the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB determination that challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843 were obvious, because the Board misapplied the law on the permissible use of common sense in an obviousness analysis. The Federal Circuit identified at least three caveats to note in applying “common sense” in an obviousness analysis: First, common sense is typically invoked to provide a known motivation to combine, not to supply a missing claim limitation. Second, as in Perfect Web, when common sense is invoked to supply a limitation that was admittedly missing from the prior art, the limitation in question must be unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward. Third, references to “common sense”—whether to supply a motivation to combine or a missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.  The Federal Circuit said that the Board relied upon conclusory statements and unspecific expert testimony in drawing its conclusion that the invention would have been “common sense.” Because the application of “common sense” was conclusory and unsupported by substantial evidence, the missing limitation was not a “peripheral” one, and there was nothing in the record to support the Board’s conclusion that supplying the missing limitation would be obvious to one of skill in the art, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s finding of unpatentability.

In DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 126 U.S.P.Q.2d 1084 (Fed. Cir.2018), the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s determination that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,218,290 were invalid for obviousness, because the Board did not provide a sufficient explanation for its conclusions, and because it could not glean any such explanation from the record.

The PTAB invoked the “ordinary creativity” which the Federal Circuit said was no different from the reference to “common sense” that it considered in Arendi. The Board relied on a gap-filler—”ordinary creativity” instead of “common sense”—to supply a missing claim limitation. The Federal Circuit said that in cases in which “common sense” is used to supply a missing limitation, as distinct from a motivation to combine, the search for a reasoned basis for resort to common sense must be searching. The Federal Circuit said that the Board’s reliance on “ordinary creativity” calls for the same “searching” inquiry. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s decision did not satisfy the standard set forth in Arendi. The full extent of the Board’s analysis is contained in a single paragraph. In reaching its conclusion that the missing element would have been obviousness, the Board made no citation to the record, referring instead to the “ordinary creativity” of the skilled artisan. This was not enough to satisfy the Arendi standard.

In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359, 121 U.S.P.Q.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the PTAB affirmance of the Examiner’s rejection of Van Os’ claims. The Federal Circuit said that it has repeatedly explained that obviousness findings grounded in “common sense” must contain explicit and clear reasoning providing some rational underpinning why common sense compels a finding of obviousness. ” The Federal Circuit said that “[a]bsent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.'” The Federal Circuit concluded that “Such a conclusory assertion with no explanation is inadequate to support a finding that there would have been a motivation to combine. This type of finding, without more, tracks the ex post reasoning KSR warned of and fails to identify any actual reason why a skilled artisan would have combined the elements in the manner claimed.”

When faced with an obviousness rejection based upon “common sense” or “ordinary creativity” or “intuition,” it is important to note that these are not a substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support. This is especially true when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified. Demand this reasoned analysis where it is lacking.

In General Electric Company v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation, [2019-1319] (December 23, 2020), the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision finding Raytheon Technologies Corporation’s U.S. Patent No. 8,695,920 on a gas turbine engine not unpatentable for obviousness, and remanded the case for further consideration because the Board lacked substantial evidence for its conclusions.

The Board found that prior art disclosed all of the elements of the claimed invention, but then found that by expressly considering at least some of the one-stage versus two-stage tradeoffs and specifically chosing the one-stage option, the reference taught away from the combination asserted by GE. The Board alternatively held that, even if the reference did not teach away from the proposed combination, the evidence presented did not persuasively demonstrate a motivation to combine.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board lacked substantial evidence for its finding that reference taught away form the combination. The Federal Circuit said a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.

The Federal Circuit also found that the Board lacked substantial evidence for its conclusion that GE did not establish a motivation to combine the references. The Federal Circuit said that the Board made certain findings that, on their own, could establish obviousness. The Federal Circuit said that these findings set forth reasons that an artisan might seek to modify the prior art, and a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.

Finally, the Board lacked substantial evidence for holding that GE did not establish the obviousness of claim 10 “as a whole.” The Federal Circuit said that the law has always evaluated the motivation to combine elements based on the combination of prior art references that together disclose all of the elements of the invention. The Federal Circuit said that

the Board’s approach would require a motivation to com-bine each element of the claim—even those present together in a reference. This analysis unduly dissects prior art references into collections of individual elements, requiring a party showing obviousness to re-do the work al-ready done in the prior art reference. The claimed invention and an invention in the prior art must both be analyzed as a whole for the same reason: an invention is more than the sum of its individual elements.

Because the Board lacked substantial evidence for its underlying factual conclusions from which it found the claims non-obvious, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings.

In Grit Energy Solutions, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLC, [2019-1063] (April 30, 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the PTAB’s Final Written Decision that Grit Energy had not met its burden of showing that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,585,341 on a discharge system for proppant used in fracking were unpatentable as obvious.

On appeal, Grit Energy contended that the Board’s determination that prior art does not disclose the ’341 configuration is unsupported by substantial evidence, and the Federal Circuit agreed. The reference disclosed that a stud on one shutter engaged an orifice on another shutter, but claim 5 was written broad enough to cover the stud and orifice being on the opposite shutters. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s findings rested on an erroneous reading of claim 5. This erroneous interpretation arose from the claims inclusion of parenthetical reference numerals. The Federal Circuit said that including references to a narrower non-limiting example serves not to limit the disclosure provided by the claims to that non-limiting ex-ample, but rather to map the embodiment to the claims.

This case is notable for crediting the prior art with the scope of its broad claims, which went beyond the explicit description in the specification, and for finding the references numerals in the claims did not limit their scope.