Dear Santa . . .

Dear Santa:

I’ve been a good patent lawyer this year, and always comply with Rule 56.  For all of the inventors we represent, I was hoping that this Christmas you would bring:

  1. A new 35 USC §101.  The Supreme Court broke the one we had.  We need a law that protects all inventions, and doesn’t exclude a whole class of inventions merely because they can be reduced to a simple-sounding concept.  A method that includes at least one non-mental step is not abstract.  It may not be novel, it may not be non-obvious, but it is not abstract.  Likewise, a product or machine is never abstract.
  2. A new  35 USC §102.  Although  the one we have is just a few years old, it never worked right.  The most fundamental concept of any patent system is prior art, yet we don’t have clarity about what is or what is not prior art.  Does a sale or use have to be disclosing or is the fact that the sale or use is known enough?  Does “secret” prior art apply to obviousness?  These are things we need to know.
  3. A new 35 USC §311 that is more fair to patent owners.  Inter Partes Review may be here to stay, but the process can be unfair to patent owners.  There is no standing requirement — a petition can be filed even if the patent owner has not asserted or even threatened to assert the patent.  A patent owner can be subjected to multiple proceeding, sometimes simultaneously, and even if the patent owner wins there is essentially no estoppel against relitigating validity in the courts.  Even after litigation is started, an accused infringer can use Inter Partes Review to change the claim construction (BRI) and the burden of proof (preponderance).  What happened to the presumption of validity.  You and your elves have a lot of work to fix this.
  4. If it fits in your bag, how about a presumption in favor of an injunction? The Constitution promised exclusive rights, but the Supreme Court seems to think otherwise.  How about limiting claims to what is disclosed and enabled in their accompanying specification, instead of invalidating claims to important inventions under §112?

Thanks, Santa, and Merry Christmas!

No Need to be your Own Lexicographer

The word of the day for December 14 from  Wordsmith.org is ensiform, meaning sword-shaped, which is a potentially useful work for patent prosecutors, and in fact has been useful to at least a few:

U.S. Patent No. 9,061,129:Col. 15: 21-25.  U.S. Patent No. 5,489,406:

Col. 3, lns. 36-47.  Lastly, U.S. Patent No. 5,460,842:

Col. 8, lns. 7-18 is a virtual thesaurus for words describing stabby things.  The English language is so rich in descriptive words that patent drafters don’t always have to make up their own.

 

 

October 9, 2017

Back when crossing an ocean to an unknown destination in a 62 foot  boat was something worthy of praise, the life and travels of Christopher Columbus were celebrated, including in this patented badge and plaque.

       

Hypothetical Claim in Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis Cannot Narrow Claim Scope

In Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., [2016-1275, 2016-1575](September 29, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Jang’s motion for JMOL, its vacatur of the jury verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and its entry of judgment of non-infringement.

At issue was U.S. Patent No. 5,922,021 on coronary stents, which the jury found not literally infringed, but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents.  The Federal Circuit noted that the district court must uphold a jury’s verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion, and in the Ninth Circuit reverses the denial only if the record lacks any evidence supporting the verdict or if the district court made a mistake of law.   The Federal Circuit noted that Jang failed to persuade the district court that BSC’s non-infringement arguments were legally erroneous, and that it was similarly unpersuaded.

On the Doctrine of Equivalents, the Federal Circuit noted that a doctrine of equivalents theory cannot be asserted if it will encompass or “ensnare” the prior art.  This is true even if a jury has found equivalence as to each claim element.  The Federal Circuit explained that a hypothetical claim analysis is a practical method to determine whether an equivalent would impermissibly ensnare the prior art. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Jang’s hypothetical claims were improper because they both expaneded and narrowed the scope of the actual claims, and such narrowing is not permitted.  While use of a hypothetical claim may
permit a minor extension of a claim to cover subject matter that is substantially equivalent to that literally claimed, one cannot, in the course of litigation and outside of the PTO, cut and trim, expanding here, and narrowing there, to arrive at a claim that encompasses an accused
device, but avoids the prior art.

The Federal Circuit explained that when utilizing the hypothetical
claim tool, that burden starts with proposing a proper hypothetical claim that only broadens the issued asserted claims, and said that Jang cannot  transfer the responsibility of defining the range of equivalents to which he is entitled to the district court.  Jang failed to meet this burden, and thus the district court thus correctly vacated the jury verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

 

 

 

 

Federal Court Lacked Jurisdiction over DJ for Non-Infringement; Where Defendant Did not Own the Patent

In First Data Corp. v. Inselberg, [2016-2677, 2016-2696] (September 15, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s declaratory judgment and defendant’s counterclaims.

The ownership dispute regarding Inselberg’s patent portfolio stemmed from a $500,000 loan that Interactive received from Bisignano, which  Inselberg personally guaranteed, and for which Interactive granted Bisignano a security interest in the portfolio of patents it owned at the time.  Inselberg and Interactive defaulted on the loan from Bisignano, and Inselberg and Bisignano entered into an agreement that purported to
convey Interactive’s patent portfolio to Bisignano.

Inselberg claimed that the assignment to Bisignano was invalid, and that Bisignano and First Data were infringers.  Bisignano and First Data brought a declaratory judgment action of non-infringement in Federal Court, and Inselberg brought an action in state court attacking the assignment to Bisignano, which Bisignano removed to Federal Court.  However the district court found that the rights at issue in the case were ownership rights turning on questions of state law, and remanded the case to state court, finding that there was no federal cause of action unless and until Inselberg recovers the patents.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, and further found that the case was not ripe for adjudication Inselberg’s claim rests upon a contingent future event, that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.  The Federal Circuit further found that the decision to remand was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and thus Section 1447(d) precluded it from reviewing the district court’s remand order.

 

 

 

 

Accused Trade Secret Thief Failed to Make Uber Showing Required for Writ of Mandamus

In Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., [2017-2235, 2017-2253] (September 13, 2017), the Federal Circuit denied intervenor  Levandowski’s petition for a writ of mandamus.  Waymo alleges
that its former employee, Levandowski, improperly downloaded thousands of documents related to Waymo’s driverless vehicle technology and then left Waymo to found Ottomotto, which Uber subsequently acquired.  Before the acquisition closed, counsel for Ottomotto and Uber (but not counsel for Mr. Levandowski) jointly retained a law firm to investigate  Ottomotto employees previously employed by Waymo, including Mr. Levandowski.  Waymo sought to obtain the report, which the court permitted, and Levandowski unsuccessfully attempted to block with a write of mandamus.  The Federal Circuit said that a petitioner has to show three things to be entitled to the writ:

First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires—a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate
under the circumstances.

The Federal Circuit found that Levandowski failed the first test — establishing he had no other adequate remedy.  While Levandowski argued that an appeal after the disclosure was in effect no remedy, the Federal Circuit concluded that a post-judgment appeal by either Uber or Levandowski would suffice to protect the rights of Levandowski and ensure the vitality of attorney-client privilege.  The Federal Circuit went on to find that Levandowski failed to show that his right to issuance of the writ was clear and indisputable.  Finally, the Federal Circuit said that  Levandowski had not persuaded it to exercise its discretion here and overrule the District Court.

Mere Quantification of the Results of a Known Process is Not Patentable

In Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire LLC, [2016-2287](September 8, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision in an inter partes reexamination that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,557,301 on a method of making cable are unpatentable under 35 USC 103.

The invention related to the inclusion of lubricant in the plastic jacket of electrical cable that will migrate to the exterior of the sheath and lubricate the surface during installation.  The Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of the claims over prior art that included a fiber optic cable that can include a friction reducing additive that migrates to the surface of the cable jacket.  Although the prior art did not specifically teach some of the details, such as a 30% reduction in pulling force, the Board held that where the claimed and prior art products are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation
or obviousness has been established, and thus the claimed details were inherent.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in relying on inherency in making its obviousness determination. The use of inherency in the
context of obviousness must be carefully circumscribed because that which may be inherent is not necessarily known and that which is unknown cannot be obvious.  While the Federal Circuit has recognized that inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness
analysis, the limitation at issue necessarily must be present in order to be inherently disclosed by the reference.  The Federal Circuit noted that the Board cited no evidence that the claimed 30% reduction in the pulling force would necessarily result from the claimed process, which contains no steps that ensure such reduction.

Thus the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in relying on inherency without finding that Summers necessarily would achieve the claimed 30% reduction in pulling force, but rather finding that it
merely renders that limitation obvious. However, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board’s error was harmless because it did not need to invoke inherency.

The Federal Circuit said that none of the patented steps differs in any material way from the process disclosed in the prior art, and there was no evidence that the claimed 30% reduction in pulling force would have been unexpected or unattainable.  In fact, the Federal Circuit said there was no evidence that the process disclosed in the prior art the at least 30% reduction.  Simply because the prior art never quantified the reduction in pulling force achieved by its disclosed embodiments
does not preclude the possibility, or even likelihood, that its process achieved the claimed at least a 30% reduction, especially since its stated purpose was the same.  The Federal Circuit concluded that In the
absence of any evidence that the claimed 30% reduction would have been unexpected in light of the prior art, there is no indication that the limitation is anything other than mere quantification of the results of
a known process.

 

as that

Follow-on IPR Petitions are Unfair to Patent Owners and an Inefficient Use of the Process

In General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,  IPR2016-01357,  Paper 19, (September 6, 2017), and IPR2016-01358, IPR2016-01359, IPR2016-01360, and IPR2016-01361, an expanded panel of the PTAB denied reconsideration of the Decision Denying Institution.

Petitioner filed a first set of petitions seeking inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 9,046,820 and U.S. Patent No. 8,909,094, which were denied based upon the merits. Nine months after the filing of the first set of petitions, Petitioner filed five follow-on petitions, two against the ‘820 patent, and three against the ‘094 patent, all of which were denied pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).

In exercising its discretion to deny each of the follow-on petitions, the Board considered the seven NVIDIA factors:

  1. Whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent;
  2. Whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it;
  3. Whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner
    already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute
    review in the first petition;
  4. The length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition;
  5. Whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time
    elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent;
  6. The finite resources of the Board; and
  7. The requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final
    determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director notices institution of review

Applying these factors to the follow-on petitions, the Board concluded that the circumstances did not warrant institution of inter partes reviews.  As to Factor 1, the Board noted that the same claims of the same patent were at issue in the follow-on petitions as in the denied petitions.  As to Factors 2 and 3, the follow-on petitions were all filed nine months
after the filing of the first-filed petitions, and after Patent Owner had filed its Preliminary Responses to the first-filed petitions, and after the Board had denied institution, without any meaningful explanation for the delay. With respect to Factors 4 and 5, Petitioner provided no explanation of any unexpected circumstances that prompted the new prior art searches, or for the delay in doing so.  With respect to Factor 6, the Board found that its resources would be more fairly expended on initial petitions, rather than follow-on petitions.

In addition the Board found that that Petitioner had modified its challenges in the follow-on petitions in an attempt to cure the deficiencies that the Board identified in its first-filed petitions, and that this shift tin Petitioner’s challenges was not the consequence of a position that Patent Owner surprisingly advanced or the Board surprisingly adopted.  The Board found that the filing of sequential attacks against the same claims, with the opportunity to morph positions along the way, imposes inequities on Patent Owner.

On rehearing the expanded Board rejected the arguments raised by petitioner.   The expanded board agreed that there is no per se rule precluding the filing of follow-on petitions, and noted that it has consistently considered a number of factors.  The Board recognized that an objective of the AIA is to provide an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation, but also recognized the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents.  The Board said that multiple, staggered petitions challenging the same patent and same claims raise the potential for abuse. The absence of any restrictions on follow-on petitions would allow petitioners the opportunity to strategically stage their prior art and arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions as a roadmap, until a ground is found that results in the grant of review.  This is unfair to patent owners and is an inefficient use of the inter partes review process and other postgrant review processes.

The Board recognized that there may be circumstances where multiple petitions by the same petitioner against the same claims of a patent should be permitted, said that the factors it uses represents a formulation of relevant considerations, and while there may be additional factors, the identified factors are a good baseline.  The Board reiterated that institution is committed the this discretion of the Commission, acting through the Board.  Reweighing the factors on rehearing, the Board found that six of the seven factors weigh against institution.