Mmm, Mmm, Obvious

Posted on by

In Campbell Soup Company v. Gamon Plus, Inc., [2020-2344, 2021-1019](August 19, 2021), the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB determination that U.S. Design Patent Nos. D612,646 and D621,645 would not have been obvious.

The ’646 and ’645 patents, which each claim “[t]he ornamental design for a gravity
feed dispenser display, as shown and described. The ‘646 patent has one figure:

U.S. Patent No. D612646, Fig. 1

Most of the features in the drawings are shown in dashed lines meaning that they are not part of the claimed design. In the ‘646 patent, the only parts claimed, were athe label area, the can stops, and one of the cans:

The ‘645 patent similarly excludes most of the drawing, except the label area and the cylindrical object in the display.

Linz, discloses a similar dislay rack. that has a similar display area and stops:

Linz, U.S. Patent No. D405,622

After buying $31 million of display racks from Gamon, Campbell’s began buying similar displays from Trinity, which caused Gamon to sue Campbells. Campbells petitioned for inter partes review of Gamon’s patents. The Board held that Appellants had failed to prove unpatentability, finding that Linz is not similar
enough to the claimed designs to constitute a proper primary reference.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the “ever-so-slight differences” the Board identified between Linz and the claimed designs did not
support its finding that Linz is not a proper primary reference. On remand, the Board again help that the patents had not been shown to be obvious. The Board reasoned Abbate was not a proper primary reference, and while Linz was a proper primary references, the claimed designs would not have been obvious over Linz alone or in combination with other references. The Board acknowledged that Linz had the same overall visual appearance as the claimed designs, but objective indicia nonobviousness, namely: commercial success, Campbell praise for the design, and the copying of the design.

On this second trip to the Federal Circuit the Federal Circuit agreed that Linz creatd the same overall visual appearance as the claimed designs. However, as to objective indicia, the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in presuming a nexus between any commercial success and the claimed designs. The Board found that the unclaimed portions of the desings were insignificant to the ornamental design, but the Federal Circuit held that: “[i]n determining coextensiveness, the question is not whether unclaimed features are insignificant to a product’s ornamental design. The question is instead whether unclaimed features are
“insignificant,” period. The Federal Circuit explained that the purpose of the coextensiveness requirement is to ensure that nexus is presumed only when the
product “is the invention disclosed and claimed. The Federal Circuit said by limiting its analysis to ornamental significance, the Board simply did not answer the relevant
question: whether the commercial produtc “is the invention.”

Under the correct legal standard, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding of coextensiveness, the Federal Circuit finding that at most, the claims cover only a small portion of the commercial product: its label area, cylindrical object, and stops. Thus it was improper to presume a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success, and it was up to Gamon to establish a nexus, which it failed to do.

The Board found nexus from the success and praise for the label area, but the Federal Circuit pointed out, this was not new. To establish nexus, Gamon needed to present evidence that the commercial success and praise of the commercial product derived from those “unique characteristics.” The evidence of commerical success presented was tied only to the label area, which was old. The Federal Circuit rejected testimony of the inventor tying the commercial success to the label area, noting that it was both self-serving and unssupported by any other evidence. Furthermore the Federal Circuit rejected the Boards view that in design patent cases, objective indicia need not be linked to the claimed design’s unique characteristics.

The Federal Circuit also relied upon evidence of copying as establishing non-obviousness, saying that even if there were copying, that alone did not overcome the strong evidence if obviousness.

Weighing all of the Graham factors, including (1) the Board’s finding that, from the perspective of a designer of ordinary skill, Linz creates the same overall visual impression as the claimed designs and (2) copying by Trinity of the claimed designs’ unique characteristics, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claimed designs would have been obvious over Linz.

Federal Circuit Holds PTO Can’t Recover Expert Witness Fees under 35 USC § 145

Posted on by

In Hyatt v. Hirshfeld, [2020-2321, 2020-2323, 2020-2324, 2020-2325] (August 18, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of an award of the USPTO’s expert witness fees in defending a civil action under 35 USC § 145 brought by patent applicant Hyatt.

In a prior appeal the Federal Circuit held that 35 USC § 145 does not entitle the USPTO to recover its attorneys fees. The Patent Office also sought reimbursement of its expert witness fees under 35 U.S.C. § 145, which provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.” The Patent Office cited a string of district court decisions awarding expert witness fees under the statute, but the district court found that these cases lacked any reasoning regarding the American Rule presumption against fee shifting, and noting recent Supreme Court emphasis of that presumption, the district court denied an award of expert fees.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that 35 USC § 145 was not sufficiently specific to overcome the presumption against fee-shifting. The Federal Circuit said that No magic words are needed to override the American Rule, but the requirement that Congressional intent be specific and explicit is a high bar. The Federal Circuit said that vague terms like “costs” are also not enough.

The Federal Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s decsion in NantKwest, noting that although the Court’s holding that attorney’s fees are not shifted does not inherently dictate that expert fees cannot be shifted, much of the Court’s reasoning in NantKwest applies equally with respect to expert fees. Tracking that decision, the Federal Circuit found the dictionary definitions of the words in the statute, the language of the statute, and the fact that in other stautes Congress specifically included expert fees, suggested that the central logic of NantKwest is applicable to its decision here, indicating that § 145 does not shift expert witness fees.

The Patent Office emphasized the long string of cases awarding expert witness fees, but the Federal Circuit said that longstanding practice is not enough to overcome the American Rule presumption.

Wayback Machine Helps Prove Exhibit was Prior Art

Posted on by

In Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., [2020-1315, 2020-1316, 2020-1379] (August 17, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded two PTAB decisions determining that some claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,289,688 were shown to be unpatentable, while other claims of the ‘688 patent and the claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,352,229 were not shown to be unpatentable.

The ’688 patent is directed to an improved controller for a games console that is intended to be held by a user in both hands in the same manner as a conventional controller that comprises additional controls located on the rear of the controller. The ’229 patent is directed to a handheld controller for a games console, wherein the controller further includes at least one additional control located on a back of the controller.

An issue in both of the appeals is whether an Exhibit to the petition relied on by Valve was shown to be a printed publication and thus prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Valve asserted that the Exhibit was a printed copy of an online review of an Xbox 360 controller published on October 20, 2010. Valve argued that the Exhibit was prior art because it was a printout of the same online article by Dave Burn that was cited and enclosed in the prosecution histories of the ’688 patent and ’229 patent.

The Board rejected Valve’s showing on the ground that the Exhibit had not been shown to be the same as the asserted prior art documents in the prosecution histories. This is essentially a determination that Valve failed to prove that the Exhibit was what Valve what claimed it to be, which is an issue of authentication. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must pro-duce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). The Federal Circuit noted that the Exhibit could be authenticated by a comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact, and that such authentication by comparison is rountine, and that the Board had an obligation to make such a comparison. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Exhibit is substantively the same as articles in the prosecution histories.

The Federal Circuit further rejected the argument that the Exhibit has been shown to be publically accessible before the priority date. The Federal Circuit said that there was overwhelming evidence that the article in another of Ironburg’s patents was prior art, and thus the Exhibit, which is substantively the same, is also prior art. There was testimony from one of the co-inventors, that he provided information to the author of the article for promotional purposes. The timing of the publication of the article was confirmed by the patent examiner via the Wayback Machine, which the Federal Circuit found was highly persuasive evidence of public accessibility. The Federal Circuit also noted that the inventors did not dispute the publication date of the article when it was cited against them during prosecution. Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the fact that Examiner found the reference after a “brief” search was highly probative evidence of public accessibility.

The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration tha tthe Exhibit was in fact prior art.

Valve also appealed the Board’s determination that Valve failed to prove that claim 29 of the ‘688 patent and claims 1-15 and 18-24 of the ‘229 patent were unpatentable. The claims required an elongate member that “is inherently resilient and flexible.” The reference showed a member that was resiliently biased with a spring. The Board found that the spring was not part of the elongate member, and the Federal Circuit found no error in this determination.

Ironburg appealed the determination that claims of the ‘688 patent were anticipated, arguing two limitations: (1) “a first surface disposed proximate an outer surface of the case,” and (2) “a second surface opposing the first surface.”

Under the ordinary meaning of these terms, the Federal Circuit found a “first surface disposed proximate an outer surface of the case” requires that the first surface of the additional control and the outer surface of the case be arranged close or near to each other, but does not re-quire them to be facing each other, rejecting Ironburg’s construction. As to the “opposing” limitation, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s construction that the “opposing” limitation is met by two surfaces that face each other or are opposite each other, and that this did not require that the surface be flat as contended by Ironburg.

Posted in IPR

Broad, Functional Claims Made it Hard to Presume Nexus for Commerical Succes

Posted on by

In Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly and Company, [2020-1747, 2020-1748, 2020-1750] (August 16, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed that Board’s determination that the claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,340,614, 9,266,951, and 9,890,210 are unpatentable because they would have been obvious over the cited prior art. The patents are directed to humanized antagonist antibodies that target calcitonin gene-related peptide (“CGRP”), that has been shown to be a potent vasodilator in the periphery.

Teva raised three challenges to the Board’s decision. First, Teva contended that the Board erred as a matter of law in its motivation to combine analysis by deviating from the motivation asserted by Lilly in its petitions for inter partes review. Second, Teva contended that even under the motivation to combine that the Board did analyze, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s factual findings. And third, Teva contended that the Board erred in its analysis of secondary considerations of nonobviousness.

Lilly asserted that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the references to make a humanized anti-CGRP monoclonal antibody for therapeutic use in humans, but the Board instead considered whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the antibody merely to study or use it. Teva insists that by not requiring Lilly to support its therapeutic motivation, the Board incorrectly discounted important safety and efficacy concerns that would have been demotivating factors—i.e., reasons why a skilled artisan would have been motivated not to make a humanized anti-CGRP monoclonal antibody. The Federal Circuit held that the Board did apply the motiviation that Lilly asserted. The Federal Circuit said that “common sense and scientific reality dictate that scientists do not “study or use” humanized anti-bodies with an end goal of treating diseases in test tubes or in rats. At bottom, the prior art supports a motivation to humanize antibodies with the goal of treating human disease.”

Teva also argued that the substantial evidence did not support the Board’s factual findings. The Federal Circuit agreed with Lilly that substantial evidence supports a motivation to make a humanized anti-CGRP antibody to study its therapeutic potential for use in treatment of human disease, noting that Lilly identified evidence that supports the Board’s reasonable readings of each reference. Under the deferential standard of review, the Federal Circuit could not replace the Board’s reasonable interpretation of references with Teva’s interpretation.

Finally, with respect to secondary considerations, the Board found that the commercial products and the license lacked sufficient nexus to the challenged claims. Teva argued that the Board made two legal errors: first, in finding no presumption of nexus between the claims and the secondary considerations based on the commercial products; and second, with regard to the asserted licenses, Teva argued that the Board erred by focusing on the licensee’s products rather than the scope of the license.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in its articulation of the standard for presuming nexus, but nonetheless conducting the necessary factual analysis of the unclaimed features of the commercial products, and reached the correct conclusion that no presumption of nexus applied. The Federal Circuit noted that the claims at issue used functional language, and that a claim to “anything that works” hardly has a nexus to any particular product. Because the claims in this case have a broad scope due to their lack of structural limitations, the unclaimed features in the commercial products cited here are of particular importance to the coextensiveness analysis. The Federal Circuit thus found that the Board’s factual findings regarding unclaimed features are thus supported by substantial evidence, and Teva has not shown otherwise.

Teva also argued that the Board erred by requiring a direct nexus between the challenged claims and the licensee’s products. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s conclusion that the license lacked nexus to the challenged claims was supported by substantial evidence. The significance of licensing a patent as a secondary consideration in enhancing the nonobviousness of an invention is that an independent party with an interest in being free of the patent has chosen to respect it and pay a royalty under it rather than litigate and invalidate it. Such action tends to support its validity. The Federal Circuit said that given that 188 patents were licensed, the nexus between the license and the validity of any particular claim is rather tenuous to say the least. The Federal Circuit noted that Teva failed to show anything more than the existence of the license. Teva did not present direct evidence that the licensee’s motivation for entering into the license was related to the validity or enforceability of the patents at issue.

The the Step that Can Be Performed in The Human Mind is a Telltale Sign of Abstraction

Posted on by

In Personaweb Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, [2020-1543, 2020-1553, 2020-1554] (August 12, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings that various
claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,802,310, 6,415,280, and 7,949,662 were ineligible for patenting, and therefore invalid, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The patents relate to data-processing systems that assign each data item a substantially unique name that depends on the item’s content—a content-based identifier.

The Federal Circuit began its review at Step 1 of the Alice inquiry, deciding whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Court evaluated the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s “character as a whole” is directed to excluded
subject matter. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the patents are directed to a three-step process: (1) using a content-based identifier generated from a hash or message digest function, (2) comparing that content-based identifier against another content-based identifier or a request for data; and (3) providing access to, denying access to, or deleting data. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims are directed to the use of an algorithm-generated contentbased identifier to perform the claimed data-management functions (including controlling access to data items (the ’310 patent), retrieving and delivering copies of data items (the ’280 patent), and marking copies of data items for deletion (the ’662 patent).

The Federal Circuit said that these functions are mental processes that “can be performed
in the human mind” or “using a pencil and paper” — a telltale sign of abstraction. The fact that the process are performed in a computer environment didn’t transfigure the idea out of the
realm of abstraction.

The Federal Circuit recognized that the step-one inquiry looks to the claims character
as a whole rather than evaluating each claim limitation in a vacuum, but said the claims are clearly focused on the combination of those abstract-idea processes, and stringing together the claimed steps by adding one abstract idea to another amounts merely to an abstract
idea. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he claims as a whole, then, are directed to a medley of mental processes that, taken together, amount only to a multistep mental process.” Ultimately, the focus of the claims is not on an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” In other words, the claims focus on mere automation of manual processes using generic computers.

At Step Two the Federal Circuit undertook a search for an inventive concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Personalweb argued that the claims contain an inventive concept because they “recite an application that makes inventive use of cryptographic hashes—a use that was neither conventional nor routine prior to the patents.” However, the Federal Circuit said this was not something “more,” let alone anything “significantly more,” than the abstract idea itself. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit said “The district court had it right: there is ‘nothing “inventive” about any claim details, individually or in combination, that are not themselves abstract ideas.’”

The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity

Posted in 101

Silence does not Support Claim Construction Excluding Prior Art

Posted on by

In Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc., v. Magseis FF LLC, [2020-1237] (August 11, 2021), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the PTAB’s determination that U.S. Reissue Patent No. RE45,268 was not anticipated or obvious, becase if a error in the PTAB’s claim construction.

The ’268 patent is directed to seismometers for use in seismic exploration, and all of its claims required a “geophone internally fixed within” either a “housing” or an “internal compartment” of a seismometer. The Board concluded that the prior art did not disclose this geophone requirement, and thus the claims had not been shown to be anticipated or obvious.

The Board construed “geophone internally fixed within [the] housing” to require a non-gimbaled geophone. It found, based entirely on extrinsic evidence, that “fixed” had
a special meaning in the relevant art at the time of the invention: “not gimbaled.” The Federal Circuit noted that

If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason
to resort to extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit concluded, based upon the intrinsic evidence, that the word fixed here carries its ordinary meaning, i.e., attached or fastened:

The adverb internally and the preposition within straddling the word fixed indicate that it specifies the geophone’s relationship with the housing, not the type of geophone. The plain
language therefore supports interpreting “internally fixed within” to mean mounted or fastened inside.

The Federal Circuit found the specification was consistent with its construction:

The specification describes mounting the geophone inside the housing as a key feature of the invention. By contrast, it says nothing about the geophone being gimbaled or non-gimbaled. Given that context, a skilled artisan would understand the claim term “geophone internally
fixed within [the] housing” merely specifies where the geophone is mounted and has nothing to do with gimbaling.

The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he specification never mentions gimbaled or non-gimbaled
geophones, nor does it provide a reason to exclude gimbals.” The Court concluded “[t]hat silence does not support reading the claims to exclude gimbaled geophones.” The patentee conceded that gimballed geophones were known, and that the specification mentioned gimballed claims. The Federal Circuit reasoned that “[i]If the patentee had wanted to distinguish between gimbaled and non-gimbaled geophones, it knew how to do so and could have indicated as much in the specification. But it did not.”

The Federal Circuit said that the intrinsic evidence as a whole supports an interpretation of “geophone internally fixed within [the] housing” that does not exclude gimbaled geophones. The Court concluded that the Board erred in reaching a narrower interpretation, and vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant’s Trademark Avoids Design Patent Infringement

Posted on by

On August 6, 2021, a California federal jury decided that Seirus Innovative Accessories did not infringe Columbia Sportswear’s U.S. Patent No. D657,093. Their verdict is notable because nearly four years ago, a jury reached the opposite result and awarded Colombia Sportswear $3.4 million before the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case.

Colombia’s patent was on a wave design applied to the lining of sportswear:

heat reflective material

Seirus used a similar wave patter on its liners, but interspersed the design with its trademark:

Serius materials

The Federal Circuit vacated the verdict because the district court granted summary judgment of infringement, rather than allowing the jury to determine infringement, and because the district court misapplied L.A. Gear for the proposition that logos should be wholly disregarded in the design-infringement analysis.

The jury instruction was fairly standard, and did not even mention the possible effects of the presence of defendant’s trademark on the infringement determination.

Claims are No Nose of Wax; Infringement Determined Under Same Construction as Validity

Posted on by

In Data Engine Technologies LLC v.  Google LLC, [2021-1050] (August 26, 2021) the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259; 5,784,545; and 6,282,551 directed to systems and methods for displaying and navigating three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets.

The preamble of the claims at issue recited: “In an electronic spreadsheet system for storing and manipulating information, a computer-implemented method of representing a three-dimensional spreadsheet on a screen display.”  In defeating a prior 101 challenge, DET argued that the invention solved a problem unique to three-dimensional spreadsheets.  On remand, Google asked the district court for a determination whether the claim preamble was a limitation, and if so, what it meant.  The district court held that the preamble was limiting, and required a mathematical relation among cells on different spreadsheets, whereupon Google moved for summary judgment of non-infringement since its accused product was not a three-dimensional spreadsheet.  The district court granted summary judgment, and DET appealed.

On appeal there was no dispute that Google did not infringe under the district court’s construction of “three-dimensional spreadsheet,” the issue being whether the preamble is in fact limiting and, if so, whether the district court’s construction of three-dimensional spreadsheet was correct.  The Federal Circuit noted that DET’s assertion that the preamble term “three-dimensional spreadsheet” is not limiting effectively seeks to obtain a different claim construction for purposes of infringement than the Federal Circuit applied (at DET’s insistence) in holding the claims eligible under § 101.  Noting that a  claim is not a nose of wax, the Federal Circuit said a patentee relies on language found in the preamble to successfully argue that its claims are directed to eligible subject matter, it cannot later assert that the preamble term has no patentable weight for purposes of showing infringement. Thus the Federal Circuit concluded that the preamble term “three-dimensional spreadsheet” was limiting.

 Turning to the district court’s construction of “three-dimensional spreadsheet,” the parties agreed that a three-dimensional spreadsheet requires cells “arranged in a 3-D grid,” but not on whether it also requires “a mathematical relation among cells on different spreadsheet pages,” as required by the district court’s construction.  The Federal Circuit found that neither the claims themselves nor the prosecution history answered the question of whether a three-dimensional spreadsheet requires a mathematical relation among cells on different spreadsheets.  However, based upon the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the preamble term “three-dimensional spreadsheet” requires a mathematical relation.  During prosecution of the application that led to the ’259 patent, the applicants provided an explicit definition of a “true” three-dimensional spreadsheet and distinguished prior art under this definition.  Giving effect to this express definition in the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims require a three-dimensional spreadsheet that “defines a mathematical relation among cells on the different pages.”  The Federal Circuit rejected DET’s arguments that the statements did not rise to the level or clear and unmistakable disclaimer,  noting that consistent with the public notice function of the prosecution history, the public is entitled to rely on these statements as defining the scope of the claims.

Definitions can be very helpful to the patent applicants in giving concrete meaning to the claims, but they can also be very limiting. It’s not that applicants should not use definitions, but that they should be used cautiously. A definition that seems harmless in one context, can be disasterous in another context.

Drug Labeling that Excludes Patented Use Can Still Induce Infringement

Posted on by

In Glaxosmithkline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., [2018-1976, 2018-2023] (August 5, 2021), the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of JMOL in favor of Teva, and reinstated the jury’s verdict and damages award for infringement of RE40,000, and remanded for appropriate further proceedings.

The ’000 patent claims a method of decreasing mortality caused by chronic heart failure by administering carvedilol with at least one other therapeutic agent.

Teva argued it could not have induced infringement prior to 2011, because it had “carved out” the indication and prescribing information for treatment of congestive heart failure in its 2007 label under section viii, and that it could not be be liable for inducement for any time period because it did not cause others to infringe the method claimed in the ’000 patent. The jury found the ’000 patent was not invalid, that Teva induced infringement of claims 1–3 during the partial label period proir to 2011, and that Teva induced infringement of claims 1–3 and 6–9 during the full label period after 2011. The jury assessed damages based on a combination of lost profits and a reasonable royalty and found Teva’s infringement willful.

The district court granted Teva’s renewed motion for JMOL, finding that substantial evidence did not support the verdict of induced infringement because GSK failed to prove that Teva’s alleged inducement, as opposed to other factors, actually caused physicians to directly infringe by prescribing generic carvedilol for the treatment of mild to severe chronic heart failure.

The Federal Circuit agreed with GSK that substantial evidence supports that Teva actively
induced by marketing a drug with a label encouraging a patented therapeutic use. The Federal Circuit said that the labeling did not omit all patented indications or merely note (without mentioning any infringing uses) that FDA had rated a product as therapeutically equivalent to a brand-name drug. Instead, the Federal Circuit said this was a case in which substantial evidence supports a jury finding that the patented use was on the generic label at all relevant times and that, therefore, Teva failed to carve out all patented indications. The Federal Circuit address the concerns of several amici, nothing that its narrow, case-specific review of substantial evidence does not upset the careful balance struck by the Hatch-Waxman Act regarding section viii carve-outs.

35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer.”The Federal Circuit explained that “[a] finding of inducement requires establishing “that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.” This requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements. The Federal Circuit said that when a plaintiff relies on a drug’s label accompanying the marketing of a drug to prove intent, the label must encourage,
recommend, or promote infringement.

The Federal Circuit found that despite Teva’s purporting to carve out the patented congestive heart failure indication, and its deletion of the indication from its pre-2011 partial label, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Teva induced doctors to infringe the method of use claimed in the ’000 patent. GSK argues that substantial evidence supports
the jury’s verdict that Teva’s partial label encouraged an infringing use (via the post-MI LVD indication) and that Teva’s marketing materials encouraged prescribing carvedilol in a manner that would cause infringement of the ’000 patent, and the Federal Circuit agreed. GSK provided substantial evidence that Teva’s partial label instructed the method of use
claimed in the ’000 patent and thus was not a skinny label, because some of the labeled incidations overlapped the patented process.

Skimpy Proof of a Regular and Established Place of Business Bares Absence of Venue for Corporate Affiliates

Posted on by

In Andra Group, LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, [2020-2009] (August 3, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of three defendants for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

Andra sued for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,078,498 directed to displaying articles on a webpage, including applying distinctive characteristics to thumbnails and displaying those thumbnails in a “master display field.” Defendants argued that venue
was improper because Victoria’s Secret Stores did not commit acts of infringement
in the District, and the related defendants did not have regular and established places of business in the District.

The Federal Circuit noted that because each defendant is incorporated in Delaware, no defendant “resides” in Texas for the purpose of patent venue. Thus, to establish venue in this case, Andra must show that each Defendant committed acts of infringement and maintains a regular and established place of business in the Eastern District of Texas. While Victoria’s Secret Stores did have a place of business in the District, the other defenants did not. Andra argued, however, that Victoria’s Secret Stores’ locations are “a regular and established place of business” of the related entities because Victoria’s Secret Stores’ employees are agents of the related defendants, or, alternatively,
because the related defendants have ratified Victoria’s Secret Stores locations as their places of business.

The Federal Circuit examined the relationship between Victoria’s Secret Stores and the related entities, and agreed that none of the facts alleged by Andra are sufficient to
prove that Stores employees are agents of the other defendants. On Andra’s ratification theory, the Federal Circuit noted that “where related companies have maintained corporate separateness, the place of business of one corporation is not imputed
to the other for venue purposes. The Federal Circuit further noted that the fact
that the entities work together in some aspects, is insufficient to show ratification.

Giving reasoned consideration to all relevant factors or attributes of the relationship” between Victoria’s Secret Stores and the related defendants, the Federal Circuit concluded that Andra has not met its burden to related entities have ratified Victoria’s Secret Stores locations as their own places of business such that they may be said to maintain a regular and established place of business in the District.

The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of the related entities who did not maintain employees or agents in the District and had not ratified the locations of a related entity as their own.