In David Netzer Consulting Engineer LLC, v. Shell Oil Company, [2015-2086] (May 27, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent 6,677,496 on a process for the coproduction of ethylene and purified benzene.

At issue was the meaning of the term “fractionating” in the claims.  The Federal Circuit noted that the district court did not make any factual findings to support its claim construction, but found that because the intrinsic record alone determines the proper construction in this case, it was able to conduct its review adequately, de novo.

Claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.  Because that meaning is often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically, the court looks to the intrinsic record, including “the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, as well as to extrinsic evidence when appropriate, to construe a disputed claim term.

The patent owner argued that fractionizing simply meant separating, but the Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that fractionating means separating compounds based on differences in boiling points.  The Federal Circuit noted that the specification repeatedly and consistently uses “fractionating” or “fractionation” to describe separating petrochemicals based on boiling point differentials. Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted, the patentee made clear and unmistakable statements in the intrinsic record, distinguishing the claimed invention from and disclaiming conventional extraction.

The Federal Circuit also rejected conflicting extrinsic evidence cited by the parties, explaining that extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic record.

Having affirmed the claim construction, the Federal Circuit likewise affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement, adding that disclaimer applied to both literal infringement and to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

In Profectus Technology LLC v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.,  [2015-1016, 2015-1018, 2015-1019] (May 26, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of “mountable,” and thus summary judgment of non-infringement.

At issue was U.S. Patent No. 6,975,308, which discloses a mountable digital
picture frame for displaying still digital images, and in particular the claim language ““a mountable picture frame adapted to digitally display at least one still image thereon,” which Profectus as asserting against certain tablet devices with stands.  The district court concluded that “the picture frame or display must have some intrinsic mounting feature—not just a feature that could potentially render the frame or display capable of being mounted.”

Profectus argued on appeal that “mountable” meant capable of being mounted, while defendants argued that the fact that a device is capable of mounting does not make it “mountable.” The Federal Circuit agreed with defendant, noting that the term “mountable” is a modifying word in the claims: “mountable picture display,” “mountable picture frame,”  “wall mountable,” and “desk top mountable.”  The Federal Circuit observed that absent from the claims are words that embrace broader meaning, such as “capable of,” “adapted to,” or “configured to.” The claim language is tailored to, characterizes, and delimits the claimed “picture frame” and “picture display.” The Federal Circuit further noted that the specification does not disclose a bare embodiment in which the picture display or picture frame lacks a feature for mounting.

By noting that the picture display or frame must have some intrinsic mounting feature, the district court correctly, specification, that the picture display or frame must include something that may be used for mounting the device.